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ElGamal-type Encryption for Optimal Dynamic Quantizer
in Encrypted Control Systems
Kaoru TERANISHI ∗ and Kiminao KOGISO ∗
Abstract : This study considers a quantizer design problem with controller encryption for minimizing performance degra-
dation caused by encryption. It is difficult to design an optimal dynamic quantizer that converts real numbers to plaintexts
for encrypted control systems with ElGamal encryption because the plaintext space of ElGamal encryption is intermittent
and does not include zero and negative numbers. A variant of ElGamal encryption is proposed to apply a conventional
optimal dynamic quantizer for encrypted control systems. The proposed multiplicative homomorphic cryptosystem,
wherein the plaintext space is consecutive integers within a certain range, can handle zero and negative integers properly.
Numerical simulations demonstrate that the optimal dynamic quantizer with the proposed cryptosystem improves the
control performance of an encrypted regulator.
Key Words : cyber-security, encrypted control, homomorphic encryption, dynamic quantizer.
1. Introduction
Threats against control systems are essential concerns in re-
cent years [1]–[3]. Encrypted control [4] is expected to im-
prove the cyber-security of control systems because it reduces
the risks of eavesdropping attacks, which are the main class of
attacks for control systems [2]. This attack is performed for col-
lecting information about a targeted control system to execute
more severe attacks such as replay attacks [5]. In encrypted
control systems, control inputs are directly determined using
encrypted data without decryption, and thus, it effectively pre-
vents eavesdropping attacks.
Encrypted control with multiplicative homomorphic encryp-
tion, such as RSA [6] and ElGamal encryption [7], was pro-
posed in [4]. Not only signals over network links but also
controller parameters are concealed by encryption. Encrypted
control with additive homomorphic encryption, such as Paillier
encryption [8], was studied in [9]. In this encrypted control
scheme, either signals or controller gains are encrypted. En-
crypted control with fully homomorphic encryption was pro-
vided in [10]. Additive and fully homomorphic encryption
require higher computational costs than multiplicative homo-
morphic encryption; therefore, multiplicative homomorphic en-
cryption would be most suitable for encrypting control systems.
Furthermore, a detection method for falsification attacks and
replay attacks based on encrypted control with multiplicative
homomorphic encryption was introduced in [11], [13].
For designing encrypted control systems, controller param-
eters and signals should be quantized. This quantization may
cause a degradation of stability and control performance [12].
Several studies were conducted to avoid destabilization by en-
cryption. The authors of [9] introduced a binary number repre-
sentation for quantization in encrypted control. This method is
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suitable for implementing encrypted control systems with addi-
tive homomorphic encryption on digital computers. The quan-
tization approach of [14] was applied for an encrypted state-
feedback controller with Paillier encryption to achieve asymp-
totic stability [16]. The quantization approach for average con-
sensus control, event-triggered control, and control of nonlin-
ear scalar systems were also considered [15],[16]. The authors
of [17] proposed a dynamic quantizer for encrypted control sys-
tems with ElGamal encryption. The dynamic quantizer guaran-
tees that a closed-loop system with an encrypted state-feedback
controller inherits the asymptotic stability of an unencrypted
closed-loop system. Furthermore, encrypted event-triggered
control with the dynamic quantizer was studied [18].
Previous studies on quantization in encrypted control sys-
tems focused only on guaranteeing the stability of a control
system after encryption. Despite the criticality of control per-
formance as well as stability in control systems, the conven-
tional quantization methods do not consider the control perfor-
mance of encrypted control systems. Minimizing the degrada-
tion of control performance caused by the quantization and es-
timating the degree of performance degradation before control
systems operation is meaningful for the efficient design of en-
crypted control systems and performance guarantee. Therefore,
we consider the following problem.
Problem 1. Given a multiplicative homomorphic encryption
scheme and a controller stabilizing a plant, assume that there
exists an encrypted controller such that a closed-loop system
with the plant is stable. Design a quantizer to minimize the
maximum error between the output of the unencrypted control
system and an encrypted control system and determine the max-
imum error.
Azuma and Sugie’s dynamic quantizer [19] may be consid-
ered a solution to the above problem. Their dynamic quantizer
is a general form of ∆Σmodulator consisting of a uniform mid-
tread quantizer, which rounds off an argument to the nearest
neighbor of a discrete output set, and a quantizer state updated
based on a quantization error. The dynamic quantizer mini-
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mizes the maximum quantization error within the scope of us-
ing the simple quantizer structure. Additionally, the maximum
error is explicitly determined simultaneously with the quantizer
design.
Despite a number of merits of the dynamic quantizer, apply-
ing it to encrypted control systems is not straightforward be-
cause, in general, a plaintext space of multiplicative homomor-
phic encryption does not include zero and negative numbers.
Numbers not included in a plaintext space cannot be encrypted,
and thus, we can handle only positive numbers as long as con-
ventional multiplicative homomorphic encryption is used. Fur-
thermore, using ElGamal encryption, a plaintext space is in-
termittent. The dynamic quantizer guarantees optimality only
when the output set of the quantizer is uniform. Note that a
naive variable transformation, such as adding a number to an
argument to shift non-positive numbers to positive numbers,
cannot be applied to convert a real number and plaintext be-
cause an identity element is not preserved before and after the
transformation. Besides, in principle, zero cannot be consid-
ered in a plaintext space of conventional multiplicative homo-
morphic encryption no matter what a variable transformation
is used since a multiplication between zero and any number is
always zero.
We propose a variant of ElGamal encryption using encod-
ing and decoding maps, converting real numbers and plaintexts
to each other to apply Azuma and Sugie’s dynamic quantizer
for encrypted control systems. The proposed cryptosystem can
appropriately handle zero and negative numbers while preserv-
ing multiplicative homomorphism. Additionally, a plaintext
space of the proposed encryption scheme can be regarded as
consecutive integers through the encoding and decoding maps.
Thus, the dynamic quantizer in encrypted control systems with
the variant achieves optimal performance. Numerical exam-
ples confirm that the proposed scheme improves control per-
formance compared to one in a case with the normal ElGamal
cryptosystem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 summarizes the preliminaries of number theory, cryptog-
raphy, and encrypted control. Section 3 describes the proposed
encryption scheme with encoding and decoding maps to im-
plement an optimal dynamic quantizer. Section 4 introduces
an optimal dynamic quantizer in encrypted control systems us-
ing the proposed cryptosystem. Section 5 provides the results
of numerical simulation demonstrating the validity of the pro-




The sets of real numbers, integers, primes, security param-
eters, key pairs, public keys, secret keys, plaintexts, and ci-
phertexts are denoted by R, Z, P, S, K, Kp, Ks, M, and
C, respectively. We define sets R+ ≔ {x ∈ R | 0 ≤ x},
Z+ ≔ {z ∈ Z | 0 ≤ z}, Zn ≔ {z ∈ Z | 0 ≤ z < n}, and
Pba ≔ {a
i mod b | i ∈ Zb}. The set of vectors whose sizes
are n is denoted by Rn, and the set of matrices whose sizes are
m × n is denoted by Rm×n. The ith element of a vector v = (vi)
is denoted by vi, and the (i, j) entry of a matrix M = (Mi j)
is denoted by Mi j. For a, b ∈ Z, we use a | b if a divides
b; otherwise, we use a ∤ b. The floor function is defined as
⌊·⌋ : R → Z : x 7→ max{z ∈ Z | z ≤ x}. The identity map on a
set A is denoted by idA.
Definition 1. The minimal residue of an integer a modulo m is
defined as








b, b < |b − m|,
b − m, otherwise,
where b = a mod m.
Definition 2. An integer a is called as a quadratic residue mod-
ulo m if there exists an integer b such that b2 = a mod m.
We use Gauss’s notation, i.e., we use a R m if a is a quadratic
residue modulo m; otherwise, we use a N m.
Definition 3. The Legendre symbol is a map from Z× (P \ {2})


















: (z, p) 7→ z
p−1














0, p | z,
1, z R p ∧ p ∤ z,
− 1, z N p ∧ p ∤ z.
2.2 ElGamal encryption
ElGamal encryption is a tuple E ≔ (Gen,Enc,Dec), where
Gen : S → K = Kp × Ks : k 7→ (pk, sk) = ((p, q, g, h), s) is
a key generation algorithm, Enc : Kp ×M → C : (pk,m) 7→
c = (gr mod p,mhr mod p) is an encryption algorithm, Dec :
Ks × C → M : (sk, (c1, c2)) 7→ c1
−sc2 mod p is a decryption
algorithm, pk is a public key, sk is a secret key, q is a k bit
prime, p = 2q + 1 is a safe prime, g is a generator of a cyclic
group G ≔ {gi mod p | i ∈ Zq} = M ⊂ Zp \ {0} such that
gq mod p = 1, h = gs mod p, C = G2, and r and s are random
numbers in Zq. Enc and Dec perform elementwise operations
for a vector and a matrix.
Remark 1. For m,m′ ∈ M, ElGamal encryption satisfies the
following homomorphism:
Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m) ∗ Enc(pk,m′) mod p) = mm′ mod p,
where ∗ is the Hadamard product.
2.3 Encrypted Controller



















xc(t + 1) = Acxc(t) + Bcy(t),
u(t) = Ccxc(t) + Dcy(t),
where t ∈ Z+ is a time step, x ∈ Rn is a state, u ∈ Rm is an input,
y ∈ Rl is an output, A, B, and C are plant parameters, xc ∈
Rnc is a controller state, and Ac, Bc, Cc, and Dc are controller
parameters. f can be rewritten as f : R(nc+m)×(nc+l) × Rnc+l →

















Definition 4. Given a controller f and multiplicative homo-
morphic encryption, such as ElGamal encryption E ,







Fig. 1 Encoding and decoding maps.
f ×Enc : C
(nc+m)×(nc+l) × Cnc+l → C(nc+m)×(nc+l)
is called an encrypted controller [4] if it satisfies
f ×Enc(Enc(Φ̌),Enc(ξ̌)) = Enc(Ψ̌),
Dec+(Enc(Ψ̌)) = ψ̌,
where f is divided as f = f + ◦ f × [4],
f × : ((Φi j), (ξ j)) 7→ (Φi jξ j) ≕ Ψ,





Dec+ ≔ f + ◦Dec, and Φ̌, ξ̌, Ψ̌, and ψ̌ are plaintexts of Φ, ξ, Ψ,
and ψ, respectively.
3. Variant of ElGamal Encryption
This section proposes a modified ElGamal encryption whose
plaintext space has uniform width and contains zero and nega-
tive numbers. Our basic idea is based on the fact that G is a set
of quadratic residue modulo p, and (m/p)Lm can be used for
encoding to G for all m ∈ Zp \ {0} [20]. The proposed cryp-
tosystem can be used to design an optimal dynamic quantizer
for encrypted control systems.
Definition 5. We define encoding maps A∆ and C , and decod-
ing maps B∆ and D in Fig. 1 as












(1, ⌊|x|/∆ + 1/2⌋ mod q), x ≥ 0,




× Zq → R






















× Zq → G
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mod p, z , 0,












(|ωMod p|, |m Mod p|), θ = 1,
(|ωMod p|, 0), θ , 1,
where ∆ ∈ R+ \ {0} is a resolution. For simplicity, we employ
Ecd∆ ≔ C ◦A∆ and Dcd∆ ≔B∆ ◦D , which perform elemen-
twise operations for a vector and a matrix.
Proposition 1. If |x|/∆ ∈ Zq, then B∆(A∆(x)) = x.




























(1 Mod 3) × |x| = |x|, x ≥ 0,
(2 Mod 3) × |x| = −|x|, x < 0,
= x. 
Remark 2. In practice, an error caused by A∆ and B∆ is
bounded from above by ∆/2, that is, |B∆(A∆(x)) − x| ≤ ∆/2.
Therefore, the error converges to zero as ∆ goes to zero.




Proof. Define maps α : (Zq \ {0}) → G : a 7→ (a/p)La mod p
and β : G → (Zq \ {0}) : b 7→ |b Mod p|. Let y ∈ Zq. If
(y/p)L = 1, then β(α(y)) = |y Mod p| = |y| = y. Similarly, if
(y/p)L = −1, then β(α(y)) = |p − y Mod p| = |p − y − p| = y.
Thus, β ◦ α = idZq\{0}.
Let (ζ, z) ∈ P
q
2
× Zq, and (ω, θ,m) = C (ζ, z). If z = 0, then
D(C (ζ, z)) = D((ζ/p)Lζ mod p, g, 1),
= D(α(ζ), g, 1),
= (β(α(ζ)),0),
= (ζ, z).
If z , 0, then
D(C (ζ, z)) = D((ζ/p)Lζ mod p, 1, (z/p)Lz mod p),
= D(α(ζ), 1, α(z)),
= (β(α(ζ)), β(α(z))),
= (ζ, z). 
Theorem 1. If |x|/∆ ∈ Zq, then Dcd∆(Ecd∆(x)) = x.
Proof. The theorem follows from Propositions 1 and 2. 
This theorem implies that the encoding and decoding maps
convert an argument without loss of information when errors
do not occur in A∆ and B∆.
Definition 6. We modify ElGamal encryption as E† ≔
(Gen,Enc†,Dec†):
Enc† : Kp ×M→ C
: (pk, (m1,m2,m3))
7→ (Enc(pk,m1),Enc(pk,m2),Enc(pk,m3)),
Dec† : Ks × C →M
: (sk, (c1, c2, c3))
7→ (Dec(sk, c1),Dec(sk, c2),Dec(sk, c3)),
where c1, c2, c3 ∈ G
2, M = G3, and C = G6. Enc† and Dec†
perform elementwise operations for a vector and a matrix. In
the following, we omit pk and sk in the encryption and decryp-
tion algorithms for simplicity.
Remark 3. From Proposition 2, we can regard the plaintext






and Zq are involved with a sign
and magnitude of plaintext, respectively. That is, the plaintext
space can be treated as a set of consecutive integers. Although
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this study considers using Azuma and Sugie’s dynamic quan-
tizer for quantization in encrypted control, the property of our
proposed cryptosystem is also useful for other quantizers. For
example, a logarithmic quantizer cannot be applied for quanti-
zation in encrypted control with the normal ElGamal cryptosys-
tem because it is impossible to design a resolution to determine
the quantizer’s output set due to intermittence of a plaintext
space of the encryption scheme. In contrast, a plaintext space
of our cryptosystem is consecutive. Therefore, we can easily
design a logarithmic quantizer resolution for encrypted control
by using the cryptosystem.
Theorem 2. Let |x|/∆, |x′|/∆′ ∈ Zq. If |xx
′ |/(∆∆′) ∈ Zq, then






Proof. Let (ζ, z) = A∆(x), (ζ
′, z′) = A∆′ (x
′), (ω, θ,m) =
C (ζ, z), (ω′, θ′,m′) = C (ζ′, z′), c = Enc†(ω, θ,m), and c′ =
Enc†(ω′, θ′,m′). Then, z = |x|/∆ and z′ = |x′|/∆′.
(i) z = 0 ∧ z′ , 0 ⇐⇒ x = 0 ∧ x′ , 0
Dcd∆∆′ (Dec
†(c ∗ c′ mod p))
= Dcd∆∆′ (ωω






















(ii) (z/p)L = 1 ∧ (z
′/p)L = 1
Dcd∆∆′ (Dec
†(c ∗ c′ mod p))
= Dcd∆∆′ (ωω











































































(20 Mod 3) × |xx′| = |xx′ |,
for x ≥ 0 ∧ x′ ≥ 0,
(21 Mod 3) × |xx′| = −|xx′ |,
for (x ≥ 0 ∧ x′ < 0) ∨ (x < 0 ∧ x′ ≥ 0),
(22 Mod 3) × |xx′| = |xx′ |,
for x < 0 ∧ x′ < 0,
= xx′.
(iii) (z/p)L = −1 ∧ (z
′/p)L = 1
Dcd∆∆′ (Dec
†(c ∗ c′ mod p))
= Dcd∆∆′ (ωω
′ mod p, 1, (p − z)z′ mod p),
=B∆∆′ (ζζ















Fig. 2 Block diagram of encrypted control system.
(iv) (z/p)L = −1 ∧ (z
′/p)L = −1
Dcd∆∆′ (Dec
†(c ∗ c′ mod p))
= Dcd∆∆′ (ωω
′ mod p, 1, (p − z)(p − z′) mod p),
= Dcd∆∆′ (ωω
′ mod p, 1, zz′ mod p),
= xx′.
Because of the symmetry of x and x′, the proofs for the cases
of z , 0∧ z′ = 0 and (z/p)L = 1∧ (z
′/p)L = −1 are the same as
(i) and (iii), respectively. 
Remark 4. In the modified ElGamal encryption scheme, mul-
tiplication between ciphertexts is allowed up to ⌊log2 q⌋ times.
Fig. 2 depicts a block diagram of an encrypted control sys-
tem with the modified ElGamal cryptosystem. In this case,
the plaintexts are denoted as Φ̌ = Ecd∆Φ (Φ), ξ̌ = Ecd∆ξ (ξ),
Ψ̌ = Ecd∆Φ∆ξ (Ψ) = f
×(Φ̌, ξ̌), and ψ̌ = Ecd∆Φ∆ξ (ψ) = f (Φ̌, ξ̌).
4. Optimal Dynamic Quantizer
To implement encrypted controllers, controller parameters
and signals should be converted into the plaintext space. This
process can be regarded as the quantization of controller pa-
rameters and signals in a closed-loop system [17].
P̃ and f̄ in Fig. 3, which is a quantized control system equiv-




















































where Q : ξ 7→ ξ̄ is a quantizer, I and O are, respectively, an
identity matrix and a zero matrix of an appropriate size, and
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Theorem 3. Suppose A is Schur, and CΣBΣ is a non-singular









xq(t + 1) = Aqxq(t) + Bq(ξ̄(t) − ξ(t)),







can be designed as
Aq = AΣ, Bq = BΣ, and Cq = −(CΣBΣ)
−1CΣAΣ,
where xq is a quantizer state, xq(0) = 0, Aq, Bq, and Cq are
quantizer parameters, and ξI is an output of P̃ in Fig. 3 when
the quantizer Q is not involved. Furthermore, the maximum





The proof is omitted due to space constraints. The complete
proof of an optimal dynamic quantizer is shown in [19].
Remark 5. Q⋆ is stable if and only if the following system is
stable [19]:
xq(t + 1) = (AΣ − BΣ(CΣBΣ)
−1CΣAΣ)xq(t) + BΣw(t),
ξ̄(t) = −(CΣBΣ)
−1CΣAΣxq(t) + ξ(t) + w(t),
where w(t) = Dcd∆ξ (Ecd∆ξ (Cqxq(t) + ξ(t))) − (Cqxq(t) + ξ(t)).
Remark 6. The dynamic quantizer may be applied for en-
crypted control systems even though the normal ElGamal cryp-
tosystem is employed by using the conventional encoding and
decoding maps [4], [17]. However, the quantization results are
not optimal [19] because the intermittence of a plaintext space
is not solved, and the maps cannot consider zero. In these cases,























D̄′c are given by the encoding and decoding maps. Unfortu-
nately, there is no efficient method to search dmax of a given
cryptosystem in our best knowledge. The computation time of
the linear search for finding dmax is O(2
k). Thus, using the pre-
vious encoding and decoding maps and the calculation of the
upper-bound are not practical if the key length is large.
Remark 7. Although the dynamic quantizer does not necessar-
ily guarantee the stability of a closed-loop system, it is possible
to achieve asymptotic stability by changing the resolution ∆ξ
according to plant behavior [17].
5. Numerical Example









































where a sampling period is set to 0.1 s.








x̂(t + 1) = (A + BF)x̂(t) + L(Cx̂(t) − y(t)),
u(t) = Fx̂(t),
where x̂ ∈ Rn is an estimated state, L ∈ Rn×l is an observer gain,
and F ∈ Rm×n is a state-feedback gain. In this case, controller
parameters are Ac = A + BF + LC, Bc = −L, Cc = F, and
Dc = O. The observer gain and the state-feedback gain are












where state weights and input weights are set to I and 1, respec-
tively.
The parameters of E† are k = 32, p = 6848919887, q =
3424459943, g = 2, h = 5527055734, s = 1076876626, and
dmax = 32. We select ∆Φ = 1 × 10
−2 and ∆ξ = 5 × 10
−2, and

















0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0.990 0.010
































































0 0 9.690 9.594
0 0 8.930 8.841



















Fig. 5(a) and (b) show the input and output of the encrypted
control system using the dynamic quantizer with the normal
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(c) Enlarged graph of u.










(d) Enlarged graph of y.
Fig. 5 Control performance of the encrypted control system using dy-
namic quantizer with ElGamal encryption.




































(c) Enlarged graph of u.










(d) Enlarged graph of y.
Fig. 6 Control performance of the encrypted control system using optimal
dynamic quantizer with the proposed cryptosystem.
ElGamal cryptosystem. Similarly, Fig. 6(a) and (b) depict the
signals with the optimal dynamic quantizer based on the pro-
posed ElGamal-type encryption scheme. In both the simula-
tion results, an impulse disturbance is added to the control in-
put at 60 s to evaluate whether the encrypted control system
is stable under the disturbance even after quantization and en-
cryption. Figs. 5(c)(d) and Figs. 6(c)(d) are enlarged graphs of
Figs. 5(a)(b) and Figs. 6(a)(b), respectively. These results con-
firm that the optimal dynamic quantizer with the proposed cryp-
tosystem improves the control performance of the encrypted
control system, and the encrypted control system inherits the
stability of the original control system.
6. Conclusions
This study proposed a variant of ElGamal encryption, in
which the width of the plaintext space is uniform and it can
properly handle zero to implement an optimal dynamic quan-
tizer in encrypted control systems. The proposed cryptosys-
tem employs encoding and decoding maps, which convert be-
tween integers and quadratic residues without loss of infor-
mation. The optimal dynamic quantizer minimizes the max-
imum difference between outputs of an extended plant in an
encrypted control system with the proposed encryption scheme
and that in unencrypted control system. The numerical sim-
ulations demonstrated that the proposed cryptosystem allowed
the implementation of the optimal dynamic quantizer, and the
quantizer improved the control performance of an encrypted
control system.
In future work, we will consider implementing an encrypted
optimal dynamic quantizer whose processes are addressed in
ciphertext space.
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